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Harald Uhlig, University of Chicago
The paper by Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon seeks to understand the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area and its
constituent countries, document its change since the creation of the euro,
and provide a structural interpretation by means of an open‐economy
model. To do so, it is building on state‐of‐the‐art modeling techniques,
most notably Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz’s (2005) factor‐augmented
vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach for the empirical part and
Ferrero, Gertler, and Svensson’s (forthcoming) open‐economy dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the structural interpre-
tation. The authors combine both wit hs e v e r a li n n o v a t i o n s ,w e l ld e -
scribed in the paper, most notably adding a risk premium on intra‐area
exchange rates. They report estimated responses to monetary policy
largely consistent with conventional wisdom. They document that the
creation of the euro has contributed to a widespread reduction in the ef-
fect of monetary policy shocks. They interpret this as stemming not only
from the adoption of a single currency but also from European Central
Bank policy, shifting toward a more aggressive response to inflation and
output.
Boivin et al.’s paper exemplifies the best of research that is currently
done at central banks as well as in a number of academic departments,
seeking to understand aggregate fluctuations and the role of monetary
policy from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. These ap-
proaches have started to replace the educated guesses with a serious
analysis based on state‐of‐the‐art modeling as the starting point for pol-
icy debates. That, in principle, is a good development.
Therefore, I hope that the approach taken here is right. But I fear that
severe problems remain and that the route taken here is not yet con-
vincing enough for others to follow. Below I shall explain why, includ-
ing material found subsequently to my presentation in Boston. Much of
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which the paper at hand is built, and that may seem like a good defense
for the authors. But this is their paper in the end, and it is their choice
which methodology to apply. Therefore, it is only fair to raise these
points here.
I need to warn the reader that this is a discussion. My aim shall be to
throw up some challenges and questions and to provoke further think-
ing on some of these issues. Whether these are fatal flaws or whether all
this can be repaired or whether everything is all right after all is some-
thing that future research urgently needs to clarify before this approach
should be put to wider use. With this disclaimer, let me get in medias
res.
I. The FAVAR Model
There are three basic premises of the empirical approach. First, there is
considerable comovement in the selected macroeconomic time series so
that their most relevant dynamics is captured by a few factors. Second,
the strategy here correctly captures the dynamics associated with
monetary policy shocks and correctly identifies their effects. Third,
the data are sufficiently informati v ea b o u tt h ec h a n g i n gi m p a c to f
monetary policy after the introduction of the euro. I am skeptical about
all three.
II. Is There Comovement in European Data?
The idea that macroeconomic variables comove has considerable ap-
peal in the United States, but perhaps less so in Europe, with its diverse
set of countries. Nonetheless, the R 2’s reported by Boivin et al. in their
table 1 seem impressive and convincing.
But I was still skeptical. If indeed a few factors explain most of what
is going on, then the sum of the few largest eigenvalues of the variance‐
covariance matrix of the data should be near the entire sum of all eigen-
values: that ratio is essentially the R 2’s of all variables on the factors
corresponding to these eigenvalues. In fact, one would want more:
one would want that sum to be considerably larger than in an artificial
data set, generated with the same univariate autocovariance structure as
in the data, but no comovement among the artificially generated series.
So, I did the following (and I am grateful to the authors for sharing
their data set with me to do this). I transformed the data from 1987:Q1
to 2007:Q3 by taking the difference of the log of the current value and
Uhlig 142its fourth lag and multiplying by 100, except for interest rates, unem-
ployment rates, and capacity utilization: that way, all data are in per-
cents. This appears to be the transformation chosen by the authors. I
call this my baseline data set. I calculated eigenvalues in three ways.
First, I took the eigenvalues of the variance‐covariance matrix of the
baseline data set, summing the largest and calculating the ratio of those
partial sums to the total sum. Next, I took the residuals from a regres-
sion of the data on current oil and short‐term interest rates, that is, se-
ries 1 and 243, and a constant and calculated the eigenvalues from the
variance‐covariance matrix of these residuals (and, as an aside, that
seemed to me to be a simpler approach than what the authors have
done). Finally, I rescaled all time series to have the same standard de-
viations before calculating the regression and the eigenvalues of the re-
siduals: from discussions with the authors, it may be that this is closest
to the route they have chosen. The results can be seen in figure 1, which
lists the number of factors (or largest eigenvalues) on the x axis and the
fraction of the total sum of eigenvalues on the y axis. For the x axis I
stopped at 30 factors, although there would be 243 (or 83) in principle.
One can see that 11 factors in the nonrescaled version explain about
Fig. 1. Calculated factors and their contribution to overall variance. Three methods of
calculating eigenvalues. Authors’ original data. This appears to look good.
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individual series results in table 1 of the authors), and five factors (think:
above and beyond short‐term rates and oil) explain about 75%. This ini-
tially looks like good news for the approach taken by the authors.
Next, I calculated the first‐order autocorrelations of my baseline data
set. I then generated an artificial data set as a set of independent AR(1)
processes,drivenbynormallydistributedshocksandwiththecalculated
autocorrelations, starting at zero (rather than a draw from the stationary
distribution) and rescaled, so that each artificial series has the same stan-
dard deviation as the corresponding series in the data. I redid the exact
same calculation of the contribution of the factors as above, using the new
artificial data series 1 and 243 as regressors: while they have the same auto-
correlation as the original data series, there is obviously no reason to expect
them to have any explanatory power for the other series. In fact, in the
artificialdataset,thereisnogenuinecomovementamongtheseriesatall.
The result for the artificial data set can be seen in figure 2. I would
have expected that figure to be quite different from figure 1 and the
Fig. 2. Like fig. 1 but applied to artificial data: independent AR(1)’s, with autoregres-
sive coefficients distributed as in the original data. This figure is not much different from
fig. 1, even though there are no “true” factors in the artificial data. Thus perhaps in
the original data, too, the true factors may account for much less comovement in the
original data than fig. 1 or the authors’ calculations would lead one to believe.
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the original data set. But the figures look surprisingly and uncomfor-
tably alike. When I first saw a first version of this figure, I thought that
it had to be due to a programming error, accidentally storing the figure
coming from the data. But it is really the figure coming from the ran-
dom data. Yes, there are differences. One factor explains as much now,
for either of the three methods. It takes a few more factors to get to the
same fraction of variance explained. At five factors for the residual, one
is at about 60% rather than 75%. Seven factors deliver about 70% for the
baseline random data rather than 80% in the original baseline data. And
12 factors are at 85% rather than 90%. For the residuals from the scaled
data, the differences are even somewhat bigger. New random draws
will generate slightly different pictures anyhow. “Slightly” is important
here. The differences from figure 1, while there, remain strikingly small.
The reason is easy to explain but perhaps tricky to formalize. There is
considerable autocorrelation in the data. Figure 3 shows the autocorre-
lation coefficients, calculated by ordinary least squares and sorted by
s i z e :m a n ya r ec l o s et ou n i t y .W i t hp e r s i s t e n tr o o t s ,d e v i a t i o n sf r o m
the mean will linger for many periods. Thus, the calculated correlation
Fig. 3. Distribution of the AR(1) coefficients in the original data, when fitting univariate
AR(1)’s to each series. The artificial data for fig. 2 were created as independent AR(1)’s,
with the same distribution of AR(1) coefficients.
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finite sample, even though there is none asymptotically. The factors ex-
tracted from a finite sample interpret these large correlations as comove-
ments, even though there is none. It all works nicely asymptotically; it
just does not work in the short sample at hand and with the large auto-
correlationsthatareinthedata.Theremaybewaysaroundthisproblem,
for example, by prewhitening the series or, at the least, by calculating the
factors from the residuals of univariate AR(1) regressions. But this is not
what the authors appear to have done.
So in sum, I fear that the approach taken and the evidence presented
by the authors are quite consistent with a world in which there is no
comovement among the series at all, and they are probably perfectly
consistent with a world in which only very few factors matter at the
European scale, but explaining considerably less than what the authors
make us believe. And without such comovement or too little variation
explained by too few factors, the approach has severe problems.
III. Are Monetary Policy Shocks Identified andIdentified Correctly?
But let me give Boivin et al. the benefit of the doubt and hope that my
arguments or calculations turn out to be somehow incorrect or not ap-
propriate. That is, suppose that the authors did indeed capture the key
comovements and 80% of the variance in the data with their seven
factors, including interest rates and oil, even if the sample was truly
large. Did they correctly identify monetary policy shocks? I have my
doubts.
For starters, it may be that all the movements due to monetary policy
shocks have dropped from the sample, once one concentrates on the
movement explained by the factors. Cochrane (1994) and many others
have argued that monetary policy shocks explain no more than 20% of
the movement in the data. It could be that much or even all of that is in
the 20% not explained by the leading factors. It is easy to see how this
c a nh a p p e nw h e ne x t r a c t i n gf a c t o r si na nu n r e s t r i c t e dm a n n e r .T h e
authors smartly include the key monetary policy instrument in their
factors, but even then, it could happen if the majority of the interest rate
movements are not due to monetary policy shocks and if other parts of
the movement in interest rates get captured by the seven‐factor dy-
namics and across‐variable correlation.
To be more specific, it is worrisome that the fractions explained for
M1 and M3 by the factors are among the lowest of all the series (see
table 1). We used to think that moving money or moving interest rates
Uhlig 146is just as good a tool for a central bank to pick a particular point on the
demand curve for money. But table 1 would have to be read as if that
demand curve is subject to huge and idiosyncratic fluctuations having
nothing to do with the rest of the economy. To put it differently, accord-
ing to these estimates, money has little or nothing to do with monetary
policy and the main movements in aggregate activity, but rather has a
life on its own. If you believe this, you have an interesting research
agenda at hand.
Butevenleavingtheseargumentsaside,Iseriouslywonderwhetherthe
approach to identify monetary policy shocks is reasonable. Section IV. A
states that it is assumed that “the latent factors … and the oil price
inflation … cannot respond contemporaneously to a surprise interest
rate change.” The argument for this approach is in Bernanke et al.
(2005), in which the authors argue that the movement in the factors is
movement due to “slow‐moving” variables, since any additional sys-
temic movement in the “fast‐moving” variables is one‐dimensional;
they interpret this as being largely explained by the surprise in interest
rate movements. But there are no such things as slow‐moving variables.
After all, all variables have a nonzero one‐step‐ahead prediction error:
they thus move fast with respect to something. The identifying assump-
tion here really is that whatever it is they are reacting to contempora-
neously and quickly, it cannot be monetary policy. Why should that be
the case? If inflation and employment can suddenly jump a bit because
of shifts in market demands, why can they not do so when monetary
policy surprisingly changes interest rates?
The defense seems to be that the impulse responses look conven-
tional. But they don’t. As figure 1c in Boivin et al.’s paper shows, con-
sumer price index inflation in Germany, France, Italy, and the euro area
as a whole tends to move up rather than down after a monetary tight-
ening, and wage inflation moves up in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Ad-
ditionally, these responses are estimated with a fairly wide error band.
The reaction seems to be somewhere between −0.3% and 0.3% in the
year following the shock. By contrast, the reaction of GDP is fairly sharp
andalwaysdown,rangingfrom−1%orbelowtoabout−0.2%intheyear
following the shock. That seems large compared to the (non)movement
in inflation.
A more convincing approach to identification is to employ the con-
ventional wisdom and therefore sign restrictions for identification, as I
have proposed in Uhlig (2005). With a panel of macroeconomic time
series and a factor approach, as in the paper at hand, there are consid-
erably more sign restrictions that can aid in identification, and the
Comment 147methodology then provides for considerably sharper bounds as well as
reasonable results (see Ahmadi and Uhlig 2008).
IV. Are the Data Informative about the Change
after the Introduction of the Euro?
I do not need to answer that question. Boivin et al. themselves provide
ample warning in their paper that this is not so. Note in particular that
no error bands have been provided to the post‐euro responses in fig-
ures 1a–c or the comparison pictures. Be wary of econometricians
who draw conclusions by comparing means without telling you the de-
gree of uncertainty! It is a fair guess that it is large. There simply was
not much time‐series variation in monetary policy since the introduc-
tion of the euro. Figure 4 shows what is going on: large and heteroge-
neous movements in interest rates before the introduction of the euro.
Hardly any movements afterward.
The authors are probably happy that the impulse responses did not
change too dramatically for several key variables. Unfortunately, there
are some in which the responses did change, leading us even further
Fig. 4. Short‐term interest rates in the EMU, authors’ data: euro area, Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium.
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monetary tightening. M3 moves up substantially now after a monetary
tightening, quite in contrast to what happened before the euro.
Oneexplanation withinthephilosophy oftheauthorsisthatpost‐euro
monetary policy shocks identified here are really capturing movements
in the stock market. For suppose that there are practically no monetary
policy shocks and that monetary policy is instead also reacting to move-
mentsinsomeotherfast‐movingvariable,suchasthestockmarket.Sup-
pose an econometrician knew that and wanted to identify stock market
surprise movements above and beyond those of slow‐moving variables.
That econometrician would have proceeded exactly as the authors did,
except that the impulse responses now would have to be interpreted as
responses to stock market shocks rather than monetary policy shocks.
How can one tell them apart? Again, sign restrictions might help.
V. The Structural Model
The paper complements the empirical analysis with a structural model
that allows one to interpret the data from that vantage point. The key
difficulty for this model is to explain the interest rate convergence in
figure 4, happening without correspondingly large inflation differences.
The authors readily admit this problem in Section V.C.1, when they
write that “the basic version of the model cannot replicate the transmis-
sion of monetary policy observed in low‐credibility regimes since long‐
term rates are tightly tied to expected future riskless short‐term rates.”
One possibility would be to scrap the model at this point.
The authors instead invent a clever deus ex machina: shocks to the
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition, which furthermore are
tied with a key parameter to foreign (or “German”) monetary policy
shocks (see Sec. V.B.3). Let me put it differently. Most of the interesting
action in monetary policy in Europe over the last 20 years is the conver-
gence process seen in figure 4. The authors sweep all that away by an
add‐on to the UIP condition, which, however, has no further implica-
tions for aggregate dynamics. Next, they then seek to study how the
changes in monetary policy from the pre‐euro regime to the post‐euro
regime have affected macroeconomic variables. Shouldn’t one worry a
bit that the baby has already been thrown out with the bath water?
There is something really interesting happening here: it is the major
big thing in the transition to the euro. We cannot quite put it into the
theory, so thus let us ignore it? Shove it into a random shock, leaving
everything else unchanged?
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frankness. Figure 4 is hard to explain within this theory. It is my guess
too that it has a lot to do with perceptions of risk and updating the
probabilities of membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU).
So, having gotten so far in setting up this beautiful model and all, I un-
derstand that the quick fix of declaring it to be completely uninteresting
and tangential was a way to proceed with the rest. But here is a memo
to subsequent research: forget about the rest and instead put this at cen-
ter stage, to understand the role of changing monetary policy in Europe!
The authors instead plug in reaction coefficients of monetary policy,
which are not obtained from the previous empirical exercise and not
obtained from estimating the structural model, but instead from an-
other empirical exercise described in Section V.B.2. One has to wonder
whether this is consistent with the initial FAVAR approach or with the
structural model at hand. Anyway, given that they use different coeffi-
cients before and after EMU, they find different quantitative results of
their model. This is what the main comparison of pre‐euro and post‐
euro in the paper rests on. Perhaps a more serious subsample stability
test, using the structural DSGE model for estimation rather than an
auxiliary model (or, at least, providing a link with the tools of indirect
inference), would be more convincing.
The connection to the empirical approach of the first half of the paper
is rather tenuous, and more tenuous than may appear at first. For ex-
ample, the identification assumption that all other variables do not re-
act to monetary policy shocks within the period is maintained. But that
follows essentially just from an artifact of notation. What is the differ-
ence between a monetary policy shock that is happening at the end of a
period and a monetary policy shock happening at the beginning of the
next? It just depends on the artificial way the continuous time line is
broken up into discrete periods. In figure 3, one could equivalently read
the impulse responses by moving them to the left by one period and
having all variables react within the period to the (beginning‐of‐period)
monetary policy shock. Also, it would be interesting to compare the
monetary policy shocks as identified by the DSGE model to the mone-
tary policy shocks as identified by the VAR.
IsthisagoodmodeltostudytheimpactofmonetarypolicyinEurope?
Note that there is no financial intermediation here. There is no finan-
cial sector that could potentially get in trouble from mortgage‐backed
securities. There is no worry about companies investing less when inter-
est rates rise, because there is no capital and no investment in the model
to begin with. High unemployment, the sclerosis of European labor
Uhlig 150markets, and the many frictions introduced by fiscal policy and the wel-
fare state are also essentially absent.
T h eo n l yf r i c t i o nt h a tm o n e t a r yp o l i c yw o r r i e sa b o u ti sd u et ot h e
stickiness of intermediate‐goods prices. Fortunately for the model, im-
porters and exporters here are no different from domestic firms. But
aren’t exchange rates fluctuating substantially more than within‐Europe
post‐euro inflation rates? If sticky prices are the main concern, shouldn’t
monetary policy perhaps be much more focused on the fact that the
dollar‐euroexchangeraterosefrom0.90to1.60—andtheensuingdistor-
tions in the relationships of fixed dollar‐euro prices—rather than the
comparatively tiny distortions created by some domestic firms not being
abletoadjustpricesbutotherscan?Putdifferently,isthemainconcernof
M e r c e d e st h a ti tc a n n o ta d j u s ti t sp r i c e sf o rc a r si nG e r m a n yw h e r e a s
Volkswagen can? Or is it more important to them that their margins
erode as they are trying to compete at German wage levels against U.S.‐
based car companies, which pay U.S. wages while the value of the dollar
collapses? And if that is the more important issue, how much might that
have played a role in the transition to the EMU for monetary policy, as a
common currency got established, and for monetary policy overall?
In sum, the model here is at the current edge of quantitative research
on monetary policy. But I am afraid that several of the most interesting
features, which really matter for monetary policy and really matter for
the transition to the EMU, have been tossed out before the analysis has
even begun. And if so, then the problems with this approach are severe
indeed. We then ought to pursue different models to address the main
issues of monetary policy.
VI. Conclusions
I enjoyed discussing Boivin et al.’s paper. I really did: some may re-
member. The paper is a serious, honest, hard‐core analysis at the cur-
rent edge of research and among the best that one can find on the issue
at hand, building on the best tools available. I applaud the authors for
what they have accomplished: this is no small feat. I am hoping that the
approach is correct and that we can build serious monetary policy dis-
cussions on this basis.
But I fear that severe problems remain and that the route taken here
is not yet convincing enough for others to follow. I have outlined why.
I fear that the approach taken and the evidence presented by the
authors are quite consistent with a world in which there is no comove-
ment among the series at all; they are probably perfectly consistent with
Comment 151a world in which only very few factors matter at the European scale,
but explaining considerably less than what the authors make us believe.
And without such comovement or too little variation explained by too
few factors, the approach has severe problems. Even if there are com-
mon factors, the monetary policy shocks may be incorrectly identified;
witness the price puzzles and the sharp reaction of output compared to
the muted reaction of inflation.
The theory needs to introduce the deus ex machina of exogenous
shocks to UIP in order to explain what must be the key feature of mone-
tary policy in Europe, namely, convergence of interest rates (see fig. 4).
Several other key issues of central importance to monetary policy play
no role in the theory either. And if so, then the problems with this ap-
proach are severe indeed. We then ought to pursue different models to
address the main issues of monetary policy.
Finally, there is a disconnect between the theory and the empirics.
All this is cause for concern. Whether these are fatal flaws or whether
a l lt h i sc a nb er e p a i r e do rw h e t h e re v e r y t h i n gi sa l lr i g h ta f t e ra l li s
something that future research urgently needs to clarify before this ap-
proach should be put to wider use.
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